













































































CONTAINING A FIRESTORM: ADAPTIVE POLICIES NEEDED TO 
ADDRESS CHANGING FORECLOSURE LANDSCAPE
Like a wildfire leaving devastation in its path, the foreclosure crisis continues to 
wreak havoc on many families and communities throughout the Fourth District, 
especially in the largest urban areas. Fueling this raging fire is the complex and   
rapidly shifting nature of the crisis. Only a year ago the primary reason for fore­
closures centered on subprime mortgages. Today, the primary driver is unemploy­
ment, further widening the consumption arc of this blaze. At­risk mortgage loans   
are forcing many borrowers into foreclosure, resulting in equity loss, credit damage,   
and possibly homelessness, along with other devastating effects on communities, 





























Figure 1. Delinquency Rates, 2009 Foreclosure Rates, 2009
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association
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The problem of troubled loans is not diminishing. 
Nationally, the delinquency rate for mortgage loans in the 
third quarter of 2009 rose slightly to almost 10 percent, up 
from 8.9 percent in the second quarter. Of the four states 
comprising the Fourth Federal Reserve District—Ohio, 
Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia—all are also 
reporting slightly climbing delinquency rates (see figure 1).
A crucial response to high rates of delinquent loans has 
been to promote loan modifications. Modified loans provide 
homeowners an opportunity to secure more sustainable 
mortgage payments through modifying original loan 
terms. In 2009, the Obama Administration launched the 
Making Home Affordable Program, aimed at helping 
distressed borrowers and servicers reach successful loan 
modifications.
Despite these efforts, many at­risk homeowners struggle  
to reach sustainable loan modifications and save their 
homes. In fact, research reveals that nationally only about 
3 percent of delinquent borrowers have been successful in 
securing concessionary loan modifications.
1 Preliminary 
research findings for loan modifications completed here 
in Ohio reveal similar results. (See sidebar “Behind the 
numbers,” pg.4)
To better understand the players and decisions involved  
in the loan modification process, the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Cleveland conducted a series of focus groups over the 
past several months with borrowers, representatives from 
servicers and lenders, and housing counselors to learn 
about the challenges to attaining long­term loan workout 
solutions between borrowers and servicers. What we’ve 
heard and learned from the data confirms what is being 
reported in the national press.
In this publication, we
	 •	 	 highlight	our	key	findings	from	the	focus	groups	and	 
other outreach,
	 •	 	 examine	some	national,	state,	and	local	efforts	to	 
connect borrowers and servicers, and
	 •	 	 zero	in	on	the	issue	of	income	interruption	due	to	job	 
loss or other factors to explore policy considerations  
from a Fourth District perspective.
Key Findings
Borrowers are overwhelmed and confused
Borrowers face a dizzying array of pressures in overcoming 
their troubled loan situations. Already anxious about the  
possibility of losing their homes, borrowers are confronted 
with multiple servicer contacts; they might receive calls from   
servicers’ collections, loss mitigation, and home preservation   
depart  ments. The result is mounting confusion and stress. 
If a loan is sold, homeowners are often forced to renegotiate 
from the beginning with a new servicer. Foreclosure rescue 
scams are an additional stress to borrowers. Noted one 
Cleveland­area housing counselor, “I’d say every client sees 
probably one or two pieces a day [of marketing] that could 
be loss mitigation from lenders, could be ‘We buy houses,’ 












Unemployment is now the  
primary driver of new foreclosures
In contrast to the early days of the crisis, when subprime 
loans were implicated as the primary driver of most 
delinquencies, the most common factor today in mortgage 
delinquencies is unemployment. Under­employment is also a 
factor. According to Neighborworks America, as of late 2009  
about 65 percent of borrowers nationally cite unemployment 
as the primary reason for their delinquency.
2 In Cincinnati, 
one housing counselor estimated that some 60 percent 
of clients seeking foreclosure prevention counseling are 
unemployed, a significant increase from earlier in 2009. 
This shift widens the scope of the foreclosure crisis, 
creating a much more difficult challenge in modifying 
troubled loans and keeping families in their homes. “I tried 
to get a modification,” one worried borrower noted. “They 
told	me,	‘We	can’t	help	you.	You	don’t	have	a	job.’”	Jobless	
borrowers with no other income sources are left with very 
few options.
Servicer inefficiencies are undermining  
the loan modification process
Communication disconnects and servicing industry 
fragmentation are hampering efforts for borrowers, 
counselors, and servicers to reach successful loan 
modifications. Borrowers acknowledged that servicers 
made numerous attempts to contact them. However, after 
establishing contact with their servicers, borrowers often 
experienced difficulties in working with their servicer/lender. 
Several reported having to resubmit lost paperwork and 
struggling to reach appropriate servicer contacts. This often  
led to high levels of frustration and feelings of help  lessness. 
“You never get the same person, even if you call back and 
ask for that person. They’ll tell you, ‘Well, hey, you [are] 
talking to me now,”’ stated one discouraged homeowner. 
Another homeowner stated that while she and a housing 
counselor were working with the loss mitigation department 
of her servicer, she simultaneously received threatening calls 
from the servicer’s collections department. “When I talked 
to the mortgage company, they still were threatening me,” 
she shared. “They’re still calling, threatening me, and saying, 
‘We’re going to foreclosure.’” 
Servicers and housing counselors alike admit to lacking 
capacity to handle the overwhelming number of delinquent 
loans. Contributing factors include high counselor turnover 
rates, time­intensive hiring and training processes, shifting 
policies and procedures, and budgetary constraints. 
One reason servicers cite as an impediment to reaching 
scale with loan modifications is that every borrower has 
a different path to delinquency involving varied loan 
products, and each loan product has its own history of 
being bought and sold by investors. “Lenders are having 
difficulty approving modifications and workouts in a 
timely way. It takes on average 60–90 days to obtain some 
resolution. Not all representatives appear to be properly 
trained in offering options, and many times the client and 
counselors must talk to several departments before reaching 
the right person,” shared one frustrated counselor.
Borrower re-defaults are adding to difficulties 
High rates of re­defaults continue to compromise efforts 
to keep borrowers in their homes. In the first quarter of 
2009, nearly 43 percent of borrowers who had originally 
been 60 days or more delinquent re­defaulted on their 
loan modifications after six months.
3 Some borrowers are 
re­defaulting because of income loss. Ohio’s double­digit 
unemployment is affecting borrowers’ ability to sustain 
even modified loans. Some borrowers may be re­defaulting 
because their loan modifications were less than optimal. 
Servicers, for example, may not be factoring in that a 
borrower’s circumstances may change in the current 
economy when offering a borrower a loan workout option. 
Often, a distressed borrower will accept whatever loan 
modification the servicer offers, unaware that they might 
have qualified for a modification with more favorable terms. 
Meanwhile, servicers and lenders maintain that some 
borrowers are not making the lifestyle changes necessary to 
support successful, sustained loan modifications. 
  “  I tried to get a modification,”  
  one worried borrower noted.
  “  They told me, 
 ‘ We can’t help you. 












The anecdotal evidence in this report points to numerous challenges 
that face homeowners hoping for a loan modification to avoid 
foreclosure. What happens once a loan is modified? To learn more 
about loans that make it past the hurdles and end up being modified, 
the Cleveland Fed’s Community Development research team began 
looking at data on loan modifications taking place within Fourth District 
states. In this preliminary analysis, we focus specifically on Ohio, hard 
hit by both the subprime crisis and deteriorating economic conditions. 
(Our full analysis will also include Pennsylvania and Michigan.) Here, 
we seek to address the following questions: How many loans are 
delinquent in Ohio and, of those, how many are being modified? By 
what means? Are these modified loans remaining current six months 
later? And, perhaps most important from a policy standpoint, which 
types of loan modifications seem less likely to re-default?
To perform this analysis, we looked at Lender Processing Services 
(LPS) data on loans originated from 2005 through 2007 in Ohio. Our 
first step was to identify loans that became delinquent—which we 
define as loans that are 60 or more days delinquent or in the process 
of foreclosure. While the LPS data set contains specifics on the 
delinquency status of loans, it does not include information on loan 
modifications. However, using an algorithm developed by colleagues 
at the Boston and Atlanta Federal Reserve Banks, we were able to 
identify loans that appear to be modified.1 
What we’re finding
In a nutshell, lots of delinquencies and not many modifications. Since 
the first quarter of 2007, Ohio’s delinquency rate has been steadily 
rising (see chart 1). The delinquency rate is calculated as the percent 
of delinquent loans out of all active loans. As shown, the percent of 
delinquent loans increased from about 5 percent in the first quarter of 
2007 to nearly 15 percent by the third quarter of 2009. 
We then identified the number of loans modified within 12 months of 
the loan becoming delinquent for the first time. The modification rate 
is calculated as the percent of loans ever modified within 12 months 
of delinquency out of all active loans. As illustrated in chart 1, we see 
that the percentage of modifications, although very low, is increasing 
slightly over time, from less than 1 percent throughout 2007 to more 
than 2 percent by the third quarter of 2009.2 
A loan can be modified by way of one or more of the following 






The first four are all concessionary, meaning that the servicer absorbs 
some level of loss with the modification. 
Of the loans being modified within 12 months after delinquency, a 
principal balance increase is the most common modification type in 
Ohio. However, as illustrated in chart 2, principal balance increases 
comprise a smaller percentage of the modifications over time, 
decreasing from 81 percent in the first quarter of 2007 to about 54 
percent in the third quarter of 2009. With respect to concessionary 










Chart 1. Rates of Delinquency & Modification in Ohio
For loans originated between 2005 and 2007 
Delinquent loans (60+ days past due)/
active loans 




Q1 Q3 Q4 Q2 Q1 Q3 Q4 Q2 Q1 Q3 Q2
Note: The percentage of loans modified is an estimate 
based on the algorithm used in this analysis.  
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland analysis of 
Lender Processing Services (LPS) data.
1   Adelino, Manuel, Kristopher Gerardi, and Paul S. Willen. 
“Why Don’t Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? 
Redefault, Self-Cures, and Securitization.” Working Paper 
2009-17. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, August 2009.
 
2   Even when extending the time period for delinquent loans  
to be modified past the 12-month mark, the modification 
rate reaches only 3 percent by the third quarter of 2009.












quarter of 2009. Fixed-interest-rate reductions have increased steadily 
over time. The percent of modifications that resulted in a principal 
balance decrease was negligible in nearly every quarter examined. 
Finally, we looked at the performance of loans by modification type  
in 2007, 2008, and the first quarter of 2009. Specifically, we look at  
how many loans re-defaulted within six months of the modification.  
We define a re-default as a loan that, following one of the alterations 
listed on page 4, becomes 60+ days past due within six months of  
the modification. 
Consistent with reports on national figures, re-default rates in Ohio 
are relatively high across four of the modification types. (The number 
of modifications resulting from a principal balance decrease is too 
small to report.) As shown in chart 3, six months after receiving a loan 
modification, nearly a third of homeowners have re-defaulted on their 
loans. While our analysis thus far does not shed light on why these 
re-default rates are so high, economic conditions and continued falling 
housing prices certainly play a part.  
We will explore the policy implications of these findings in our 
complete report on this research, which will be completed in the first 
quarter of 2010. For additional research from the Cleveland Fed’s 
Community Development group, go to www.clevelandfed.org/
communitydevelopment.
 
Percent Chart 3. Re-default rates within six months of modification
For loans originated between 2005 and 2007 and 
















Percent Chart 2. Loan modifications by type
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Note: The percentage of loans modified is an estimate 
based on the algorithm used in this analysis. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland analysis of 
Lender Processing Services (LPS) data.
Note: The percentage of loans modified is an estimate 
based on the algorithm used in this analysis. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland analysis of 













Over the past couple of years, several initiatives have  
been employed to help distressed borrowers work with  
their servicers to reach sustainable loan modifications  
or other workout solutions. Some of these efforts are  
showing promising results, while others are falling short  
of expectations.
Borrower outreach events
In 2007, the federal government introduced HOPE 
NOW, a voluntary servicer industry plan to modify 
troubled mortgages. These large­scale outreach events 
held throughout the country, including many here in 
the Fourth District, provide distressed homeowners the 
opportunity to meet face­to face with their servicer/lender. 
HOPE NOW reports that nationally nearly 3 million 
loan	workouts	were	completed	from	July	2007	through	
November 2008. However, a Congressional Oversight 
Panel report released in March 2009 reveals that “a 
majority	of	these	‘workouts’	were	repayment	agreements	
that increased homeowners’ monthly payment.”
4 
Recent workout figures through the third quarter of 2009 
released by HOPE NOW present slightly better results. 
During this period, loan modifications represented about  
51 percent of all reported loan workouts, up from the  
42 percent in 2008. Despite these improvements, some 
continue to question the success of this voluntary industry 
plan.
5
Making Home Affordable Program
In March 2009 the Obama Administration launched a 
plan to stabilize housing markets and help 3–4 million 
Americans reduce their monthly mortgage payments 
to affordable levels over the next three years. The plan, 
called Making Home Affordable, consists of two primary 
features—the Home Affordable Modification Program 
(HAMP) and the Home Affordable Refinance Program 
(HARP). Under the HAMP, eligible delinquent borrowers 
or those at risk of imminent default have an opportunity 
to secure loan modifications, reducing payments to no 
more than 31 percent of their gross income. Servicers 
are encouraged by incentives to modify these troubled 
mortgage loans. Another aspect of the plan available 
through HARP provides borrowers who are ‘upside down’ 
on their loans an opportunity to refinance. 
Treasury reports that increasing numbers of trial modifi­
cations have been extended and accepted (see figure 2), and 
nearly 4 million borrowers have refinanced their troubled 
loans through the HARP. According to Treasury, the 
Making Home Affordable Program is on target to meet its  
established goals. One significant drawback to the Obama  
Administration’s Making Home Affordable plan, however, is 













Making Home Affordable: Analysis of Current Data on Program Results
In January 2010 the U.S. Treasury released its monthly Servicer Performance Report for the Making Home Affordable 
Program (HAMP). The report details the number of HAMP loan modifications offered and accepted by borrowers through 
December 2009, at both aggregate and servicer-specific levels. Nationally, 1,164,507 trial modifications have been 
extended to homeowners, representing an 11 percent increase from November. The actual number of trial modifications 
started, which includes all loans in which at least one new payment has been made, is 902,620. Trial modifications are 
up 19 percent from November. Permanent modifications completed by year-end 2009 total 66,465, representing an  
increase of 52 percent from November. Overall, 25 percent of the estimated 3.3 million borrowers 60-plus days delinquent 
are currently in a trial modification. The modification performance of participating servicers varies significantly. 
Source: FinancialStability.gov
Figure 2. 2009 HAMP Trial Modifications (cumulative, by month) 
  HAMP Trial Modifications    HAMP Trial Plans Offered to Borrowers
May and Prior June  July August September October










Also, because of the heavy emphasis on reaching loan 
modifications through the Making Home Affordable 
Program, some other, perhaps more advantageous, 
workout options for borrowers are being overlooked. 
Area housing counselors are concerned that some options 
available prior to the Making Home Affordable Program 
are no longer being considered by some servicers and 
lenders. To ensure that servicers and lenders continue 
to explore all possible loan workout options available for 
borrowers beyond Making Home Affordable, an added 
incentive might be considered. One way to offer this 
incentive would be for the U.S. Department of Treasury 
to agree to include all sustainable workouts in a servicer’s 
monthly progress report. Presently, this report captures 
only loan modifications completed through the Making 
Home Affordable Program.
Promising APProAChes  
to ConneCt Borrowers 
with their serviCers
In light of current initiative shortcomings, other approaches 
to connect borrowers with their servicers are being 
launched.	While	many	of	these	programs	are	just	getting	
off the ground, it appears that they can play a vital role in 
connecting borrowers with servicers and an opportunity to 
negotiate a successful loan workout solution.
Foreclosure prevention phone-a-thon
A new outreach approach recently introduced by the U.S. 
Department of Treasury improves on previous efforts. 












the Homeownership Center of Greater Cincinnati to 
conduct a three­day foreclosure prevention phone­a­thon. 
With this effort, callers will benefit from working with a 
certified housing counselor in developing an action plan, 
a budget, and financial analysis, followed by a face­to­
face appointment with the caller’s servicer/lender. The 
plan aims to produce sustainable workout solutions and 
reduce the time it normally takes servicers to process 
and reach workout solutions from 180 days or longer 
to 30 days. According to the Homeownership Center of 
Greater Cincinnati, the phone­a­thon generated 4,434 
calls resulting in 435 homeowners meeting with their 
servicers. These meetings led to more than 120 instances 
of homeowners avoiding foreclosure. Based on the initial 
success of the program, Treasury is now considering this 




Court­mediated foreclosure programs are  
rapidly emerging throughout the country as another  
option to tackle the persistent foreclosure crisis. These  
programs	vary	by	jurisdiction,	but	generally	a	representative	  
of the borrower’s servicer/lender who is authorized to 
negotiate settlements is required to meet with an eligible 
borrower and a court­appointed mediator to work toward 
a successful workout solution. Not all court­mediated 
negotiations, however, result in resolution.
In 2007 the Ohio Supreme Court developed a program 
mediation model, clearing the way for Ohio counties 
to develop foreclosure prevention programs. Today, all 
of Ohio’s counties offer some level of court foreclosure 
mediation.	Cuyahoga	County’s	program,	launched	in	June	
2008, requires homeowners to meet a minimum threshold 
of having monthly expenses equal to or less than monthly  
income, or otherwise be willing to consent to the foreclosure   
or provide a deed in lieu of foreclosure. According to  
the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, nearly  
20 percent of homeowners apply, most of whom (roughly  
87 percent) are accepted into the program. Of those 
participating, more than half avoid foreclosure through 
mediated settlements. The average time it takes to reach a 
successful loan workout solution is 120 days.
PoliCy oPtions to  
Aid Borrowers with  
disruPted inCome
Policymakers looking to stem the mortgage foreclosure 
crisis and help re­stabilize neighborhoods are assessing 
several legislative proposals. Many of these proposed 
policies play out quite differently when examined from a 
regional perspective. National policymakers are exploring 
several ideas that would allow eligible borrowers facing 
unexpected income loss or disruptions an opportunity 
to stabilize their financial situations while trying to avert 
foreclosure. 
One existing program is the Pennsylvania Homeowner’s 
Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program (HEMAP). 
Launched in 1983, HEMAP was Pennsylvania’s response 
to homeowners struggling to stay in their homes in the  
wake of the state’s steel industry nosedive and thousands 
of	jobs	lost.	Through	HEMAP,	Pennsylvania	homeowners	
can secure two types of loan assistance, one designed 
to bring delinquent loans current and another targeting 
those homeowners requiring ongoing assistance in 
making their mortgage payments. According to Brian 
Hudson Sr., executive director and CEO, Pennsylvania 
Housing Finance Agency, the state’s HEMAP has been 
very successful, saving 42,700 families from foreclosure 
by providing more than $442 million in loans to at­risk 
homeowners since 1983. 
To date, the state has appropriated $225.5 million to 
capitalize the HEMAP program to assist struggling 
homeowners. Of that amount, more than $246 million— 
in repayments including interest and principal from some 
20,000 loans—has been repaid. These repayments are 
used to replenish program funding to assist additional 
homeowners struggling to keep their homes.
A hardship relief program like Pennsylvania’s could offer 
much­needed assistance to many distressed borrowers 
throughout the Fourth District. In fact, at a national level  
a government payment­sharing plan has been proposed  
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston; this proposal offers 













Under this plan, homeowners suffering from significant 
income disruptions that have mortgage balances exceeding 
the values of their homes would be eligible for government­
sponsored mortgage payment assistance. Borrowers 
confronting this scenario are unlikely to be able to refinance  
or sell their homes or find assistance with existing foreclosure  
prevention programs. 
The Boston Fed plan recommends extending financial 
assistance through both grants and loans. Grant assistance 
would be available for those borrowers significantly affected 
by income loss due to unemployment and with little to 
no other financial resources. Borrowers facing decreased 
household	income	resulting	from	job	loss	or	reduced	work	
hours would be required to repay government­issued 
payment assistance with interest. Rates for these loans would 
be set above prime to discourage abuse. In either case, 
payment assistance would expire once a homeowner regains 
financial stability or after two years, whatever comes first.
ConClusions
Clearly, policymakers must consider the multiple challenges 
facing homeowners, servicers, and civic leaders in different 
kinds of communities when crafting a comprehensive policy 
approach to overcome the foreclosure crisis and stabilize 
neighborhoods. What works in one area may not work in  
another. The circumstances driving this crisis are shifting 
faster than programs can be designed and implemented. 
Further compounding the situation is that the Fourth District   
consists of many weak­market communities, which are more 
vulnerable to delayed economic turnarounds given current 
high unemployment and foreclosure rates. A report by the 
Brookings Institution showing second quarter of 2009  
economic performance of the nation’s 100 largest metro­
politan areas includes six Fourth District regions—Akron, 
Dayton, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Toledo, and Youngstown—
among the nation’s weakest markets (characterized by high 
population	loss,	declining	property	values,	slow	to	no	job	
growth, and struggling economic environments). A weak 
regional economy exacerbates the pressure on homeowners 
already at risk of foreclosure. 
Servicer inefficiencies continue to frustrate homeowners 
looking to prevent foreclosure. Bolstering current efforts 
that connect borrowers with lenders and servicers and 
expedite sustainable loan modification outcomes is a critical 
first step. New promising efforts highlighted in this report 
may provide some relief; however, servicers also must take 
a more active role in overcoming these challenges.
In addition, the lack of assistance to unemployed home­
owners through Making Home Affordable and other 
foreclosure prevention programs highlights a huge gap in 
helping borrowers with income disruptions. The increase in 
mortgage delinquencies from unemployment underscores 
the need to include a national HEMAP­like relief program 
as part of a comprehensive policy solution. A flexible, more 
accommodating policy approach to helping distressed 
homeowners can act as a firewall to prevent further spread 
of and damage from this pernicious crisis. CR foRum
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